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ABSTRACT
In their discussion paper of November 
2020, Cook et al present a draft protocol for 
navigating circumstances in which emergency 
services are overwhelmed. Their paper 
suggests that COVID- related triage decisions 
should be based on clinical assessment, 
patient and family consultation, and a range 
of ethical considerations. In this response, we 
note that the protocol exhibits an ambiguity 
that is likely to result in irresolvable dilemmas 
when put into practice. This ambiguity is 
exemplified in the paper’s prime ethical 
imperative (to ’save more lives and more years 
of life’), which takes the form of an undefined 
conjunction whose practical implications are 
left unspecified. We see this ambiguity in 
the prime imperative as one manifestation 
of a broader set of tensions in the protocol. 
We show that the discipline of human rights 
provides an essential supplement to the ethical 
framework on which Cook and colleagues rely, 
providing a framework for understanding and 
working through triage dilemmas involving 
age, discrimination and equality.
INTRODUCTION
In the absence of a national COVID-19 
triage policy, local hospital ethics commit-
tees across the NHS have had to develop 
their own policies and procedures for navi-
gating circumstances in which emergency 
services are overwhelmed. In the context 
of these challenging deliberations, the 
discussion paper and draft triage protocol 
produced by Cook and colleagues at the 
Royal United Hospital Bath is a welcome 
contribution.1 On many particular points, 
we find ourselves sympathetic to what 
we shall refer to as ‘the Bath protocol.’ 
However, we note that the proposed 
protocol exhibits an ambiguity and can be 
expected to yield practical dilemmas when 
put into practice. These dilemmas resist 
resolution within the proposed frame-
work and point towards the need for a 
more direct incorporation of principles 
drawn from human rights.
One of the many welcome features of 
the Bath discussion paper is its attempt 
to be explicit about the ethical underpin-
nings of the approach it recommends. 
The main body of the discussion paper 
articulates a set of eight ‘ethical factors’—
factors which are elaborated in an online 
Appendix devoted to ‘ethical context in 
a pandemic.’ The first and pre- eminent 
ethical consideration underlying the Bath 
protocol is articulated as follows: ‘Aim to 
save more lives and more years of life.’ 
It is notable that this prime imperative 
of the Bath protocol takes the form of a 
conjunction. Save more lives AND save 
more years of life. The two conjuncts 
in this imperative are not equivalent, 
but neither the protocol nor its ethical 
appendix clarifies the relationship 
between them. This ambiguity creates 
the potential for practical dilemmas in 
circumstances where the two conjuncts 
pull in different directions.
We see this ambiguity in the prime 
imperative as one manifestation of a 
broader set of tensions in the protocol 
pertaining to age, discrimination and 
equality. For example, the protocol firmly 
rejects the use of age as a sole determi-
nant of ICU admission, claiming that 
such a policy would be discriminatory. 
But at the same time, it recognises that 
applying the protocol “may mean giving 
priority to younger patients.” Once again, 
neither the protocol itself nor the ethical 
appendix explains the basis for rejecting 
an age- based policy while endorsing one 
based on life- years. We suggest that these 
gaps and tensions in the Bath protocol 
can be traced back to a common source: 
the absence of sufficiently robust human 
rights considerations from its ethical 
substructure. Attention to human rights 
principles is of course a legal obligation. 
We believe that it also holds the key for 
improving the Bath protocol by (1) more 
clearly articulating the ethical foundations 
on which it is built, (2) providing a prin-
cipled framework for resolving the ambi-
guity in its first principle and (3) raising 
a warning flag regarding one of its most 
controversial features.
DISCRIMINATION
Decisions regarding the allocation of crit-
ical care resources clearly engage the right 
to life, which is protected under interna-
tional,2 European3 and domestic human 
rights law.4 But measures undertaken 
to protect life are also subject to other 
important human rights considerations, 
principally the prohibition of discrimina-
tion.5 6 A discriminatory policy or practice 
is one that directly or indirectly disadvan-
tages members of certain groups, such as 
older people, without an objective and 
reasonable justification for their differen-
tial treatment. This is a first area where we 
see the potential for human rights analysis 
to refine the Bath protocol.
One of the many tragic facts about 
COVID-19 is that epidemiologically 
relevant determinants of survival rates 
often coincide at the population level 
with traits that are ‘protected charac-
teristics’ under human rights standards, 
including age and disability. COVID-19 
triage procedures must accordingly walk 
something of a tightrope: incorporating 
sensitive epidemiological data into clin-
ical decision- making without lapsing into 
discrimination. Citing guidance from the 
BMA, Cook and colleagues repudiate 
critical care ‘cut- off ’ policies based on 
age or disability, on the grounds that they 
amount to unlawful direct discrimination. 
We concur. And we applaud the central 
pillar of their proposed alternative, which 
emphasises that triage decisions must 
always be made on an individual basis, 
taking into account individual circum-
stances and leaving scope for clinical 
judgement. Age will certainly inform 
individualised assessments, but under the 
Bath protocol the ultimate driver would 
be prognosis—specifically prognosis for 
recovery with the help of emergency 
treatment.
But avoidance of across- the- board age- 
based cut- offs does not suffice to safe-
guard against age discrimination. A triage 
policy built on the foundation of human 
rights must also be alive to the possi-
bility of indirect discrimination. The Bath 
protocol’s incorporation of a life- years 
approach certainly raises the spectre of 
indirect discrimination, as its implementa-
tion would result in triage decisions that 
particularly disadvantage older persons. 
This by itself does not show that a life- 
years approach is unacceptable, but it does 
mean that such an approach calls for strict 
scrutiny. Specifically, it would need to be 
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shown that there exists an ‘objective and 
reasonable justification’ for a life- years 
approach. Does it pursue a legitimate aim, 
and are the chosen means proportionate 
to that aim?7
We are doubtful about the ability of 
the life- years component of the Bath 
protocol to survive strict scrutiny. Cook 
and colleagues have not themselves spec-
ified how the second conjunct of their 
prime imperative would work in practice. 
Consider two possibilities. A life- years 
criterion might contribute to triage deci-
sions as a straightforward function of age, 
with younger people assigned a higher life- 
years rating than their elders. But such an 
approach would be functionally indistin-
guishable from an age cut- off, which the 
Bath protocol rightly renounces. It would 
also not constitute an objective assessment 
of prospective life- years since life expec-
tancy varies by factors other than age. 
An alternative more in keeping with the 
Bath approach would be to undertake an 
individualised assessment of expected life- 
years for each patient, taking into account 
the various demographic factors that influ-
ence life expectancy, including socioeco-
nomic status and disability.8 The negative 
impacts of such an approach on already 
disadvantaged groups within society is 
difficult to gauge, but they are sufficiently 
grave to raise doubts as to whether such 
a policy could pass a proportionality test, 
which is satisfied only if it can be shown 
that the impact of the policy on the inter-
ests of those groups is not ‘excessive’ in 
relation to the aim being pursued.9
EQUALITY AND EQUAL WORTH
The overarching purpose of the modern 
human rights movement is to protect the 
equal dignity and worth of all human 
beings.10 In order to fulfil this purpose in 
the context of healthcare, international 
human rights standards call for individ-
uals to be provided with equal opportu-
nities to access healthcare services.11 This 
equal access imperative is in turn echoed 
in the NHS Constitution.12 The prin-
ciple that all lives are of equal dignity and 
worth provides additional grounds for 
scepticism about a life- years approach to 
triage, which implicitly treats a longer life 
as intrinsically more worth saving than a 
shorter one. But its importance as a supple-
ment to the ethical framework of the Bath 
protocol becomes particularly clear in the 
context of so- called ‘tie- breakers.’
Prognosis- driven triage reaches an 
intrinsic limit when clinical factors do not 
suffice to distinguish among patients. At 
that point, some supplementary principle 
of distinction must be adopted. The most 
prominent tie- breaking recommendation 
within the Bath proposal is that a ‘random 
allocation, such as a lottery’ be used to 
rank patients with similar prognoses. 
But the protocol also invokes two more 
controversial tie- breaking mechanisms: 
priority for individuals with the potential 
to contribute to the maintenance of crit-
ical infrastructure; and priority for volun-
teers in vaccine trials and other medical 
research relevant to the pandemic. These 
additional tie- breaking standards have an 
equivocal status within the protocol; the 
authors describe them as “retained but 
downgraded.”
The prioritisation of patients based on 
‘factors that might benefit wider society’ 
clearly invites scrutiny based on the prin-
ciple of equality. For every patient moved 
up in a triage queue on the basis of their 
social utility, someone else is moved 
down, limiting their access to healthcare 
services on the basis of an assessment of 
their lower predicted value to society.
How do the two ‘downgraded’ tie- 
break mechanisms fare when assessed 
in a human rights framework? Consider 
first a policy of ‘rewarding’ volunteers 
in vaccine trials. Suppose that the aim of 
such a policy is to ensure that there is a 
sufficient supply of participants in these 
vitally important trials, and more broadly 
to ensure that the trials can be successfully 
completed. This would certainly pass the 
‘legitimate aim’ arm of the test. But in the 
absence of some compelling link between 
such a system of rewards and the success 
of the trials programme, it would fail to 
satisfy the proportionality test and so fail 
to constitute a permissible departure from 
the duty to promote and respect equali-
ty—a duty which stands at the head of the 
NHS Constitution. Otherwise put: indi-
viduals have a right to be treated equally 
in triage regardless of whether they volun-
teered for a vaccine trial, chose not to, or 
were never presented with the opportu-
nity in the first place.
Applying the same standard of scrutiny 
to priority for ‘front line workers’ is more 
challenging. Ensuring the continuing oper-
ation of critical infrastructure certainly 
passes the legitimate aim test. Where staff 
shortages are sufficiently acute, prioritisa-
tion of care for frontline workers might 
become a necessary means for protecting 
the workforce. But prioritisation on the 
basis of ‘social utility’ still faces two acute 
challenges: objectively identifying the 
point at which infrastructural strains justify 
prioritisation and providing a reasonable 
definition of ‘frontline worker’ for those 
purposes. Because these challenges are not 
addressed in the Bath protocol, it does not 
provide an adequate justification for using 
such a principle of prioritisation.
CONCLUSION
We are not under the illusion that a 
human rights framework will provide 
definitive answers to the many challenges 
associated with triage policy. We submit, 
however, that human rights consider-
ations must have a central place in the 
‘ethical context in a pandemic,’ and that 
their inclusion provides a set of analyt-
ical tools to help structure the assess-
ment of triage proposals. The principle 
of ‘saving more lives’ is a classic example 
of a consequentialist ethical framework. 
That is, it defines the ethical context of 
triage by defining the desired outcome. 
An approach to triage informed by human 
rights standards will recognise that there 
are ethically significant constraints on 
the means by which such an aim is to 
be achieved. We have argued here that 
these constraints include a commitment 
to avoid direct discrimination and also 
a practice of ‘strict scrutiny’ for policies 
that threaten indirect discrimination, 
together with robust commitment to the 
principle that all human lives have equal 
worth and dignity. These principles, 
supplemented by the rigorous application 
of the established human rights tests for 
necessity and proportionality, can play a 
role in shaping triage practices that meet 
the highest possible ethical standards.
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